the signature size is independent of the number of the signers. However, since the signature generation algorithm is deterministic, it has a bad reduction rate as a defect. Consequently, the signers must unfortunately use the keys large enough to keep the security. On the other hand, in the PSSbased schemes, good reduction rates can be obtained since the signature generation algorithms are probabilistic. However, the size of the random component shall overflow the security parameter, and thereby the signature size shall grow by the total size of the random components used the signers. That means, if the size of the random component is smaller, the growth of the signature size can be kept smaller. In this paper, we propose new probabilistic multi-signature scheme, which can be proven secure despite that smaller random components are used. We compare the proposed scheme and two existing schemes. Finally, we conclude that the proposed scheme is so-called optimal due to [3] . key words: multi-signature scheme, exact security, random oracle model
Introduction
The concept of multi-signature schemes and a concrete scheme were introduced by Itakura et al. [4] in 1983. In a multi-signature scheme, plural signers can jointly and efficiently sign an identical message. In 2001, the messageflexible multi-signature schemes were introduced by Mitomi et al. [10] . In such a scheme, the message to be signed can be modified by participating signers. The scheme [10] is the multi-signature version of f -FDH [1] .
Unfortunately, the paper [10] has not made the security consideration sufficiently clear. Accordingly, [5] gives the restrict security proof for the scheme [10] , and proposes the multi-signature version of f -PSS [2] . However the PSSbased scheme [5] has a defect on the efficiency, and in other words the size of the security parameter depends on the number of the participating signers. In [7] , Komano et al. propose the PSS-based scheme, which overcomes the defect on the computational cost that the scheme [5] holds. The scheme [5] prevents the security parameter from increasing by the following means: the signature of the pervious signer is divided into two parts, the folding part and the transmitting part. The folding part is of the size of the security parameter, and the transmitting part is what is overflowed outside the security parameter. This technique has already introduced by Okamoto in [12] . In the PSS-based scheme, a random component is used so that the scheme can obtain the tightest security reduction rate. Accordingly, only the size of the random components should occur in the transmitting part since it is necessary to share all the information on the random components used by the participating signers. Thus, in the probabilistic multi-signature scheme, the key point to make the scheme more efficient is reduced to how to make the size of the random salts smaller. In Eurocrypt'04, the sequential aggregate signature scheme is proposed by Lysyanskaya et al. [8] . We regard this scheme as the message flexibility multi-signature scheme using trapdoor one-way permutations f . The scheme is proposed independently of [10] , and is given the security proof. However the formulae are almost the same with those in [10] . Also in this scheme used is the same technique with [12] . Therefore the signature size is prevented from increasing. However, the reduction rate for the security of [8] is loose, because the scheme is an f FDH-based multisignature scheme. Thus this scheme has to need the long key for the security.
In this paper, we propose the probabilistic FDH-based multi-signature scheme. The proposed scheme can obtain the tightest security proof by using the random salt. Comparing with the Komano scheme [5] , the proposed scheme has much simpler structure. Especially, only one hashing is necessary to generate a signature. Moreover, the security performance is guaranteed by shorter random components. Thus the proposed scheme is much more efficient. In our scheme, the size of random components can be reduced to be optimal. The term of optimal is due to [3] . This paper is organized as follows. After the introduction, we will provide the notations we use in this paper, the definition of a multi-signature scheme and its adversary model in Sect. 2. In Sect. 3, we will describe the existing schemes and its security. In Sect. 4, we will present the proposed scheme. In Sect. 5, we will argue the security and will give the security proof. In Sect. 6, we will first give a trivially constructed multi-signature scheme (a trivial scheme), and will estimate the efficiency of the proposed scheme by comparing with those of some other existing schemes including the trivial schemes. Finally, Sect. 7 will conclude Copyright c 2005 The Institute of Electronics, Information and Communication Engineers this paper.
Definitions

Notations
First of all we mention the notation. To denote an L -tuple (a 1 , . . . , a L ), we often use the bold letter a. For an L -tuple a(= (a 1 , . . . , a L )) and
Multi-Signature Scheme
We suppose that the total set of potential signers is P := {P 1 , . . . , P L }. In a multi-signature scheme where certain subsets P := {P 1 , . . . , P L } ⊆ P participate, each signer P i publishes a public-key pk i , while keeping the corresponding secret-key sk i , and the coalition of all signers P proves the validity of a message m authenticated by them. Such a situation can be trivially realized by L -time iteration of a single signature scheme † . The total signature size in a multi-signature scheme is less than L times of the size in the single signature scheme used, while in a trivial scheme, it is just L times of the size in the single signature scheme. Probabilistic key generation algorithm: Gen is a probabilistic algorithm which is given 1 K i by each signer P i ∈ P , where K i is the security parameter, produces a pair of matching public-key pk i and secret-key sk i . Probabilistic multi-signing algorithm: MSig takes a message m to be signed, the partial multi-signature σ i j−1 (σ i 0 = 1) and (pk i j , sk i j ), and returns a multi-
Deterministic verification algorithm:
This algorithm is run to verify a given multi-signature by an individual verifier, possibly not belonging to P . The verification algorithm Ver takes a message m, a candidate multisignature σ L and the public-keys pk [1,L ] . It returns 1 if the multi-signature is valid, and 0 otherwise. Note that the verification algorithm is deterministic.
One-Way Trapdoor Permutation
We recall the notation of a one-way trapdoor permutation.
Definition 2.2 (One-Way Trapdoor Permutation):
A oneway permutation family is given by two probabilistic polynomial time (PPT) algorithms (Gen, Eval) such that:
where f pk i is a permutation, and the following security property holds for any PPT Alg:
for any c > 0, where Dom(pk i ) is the set of legal domain elements (inputs) for f pk i . A one-way trapdoor permutation family is a one-way permutation family with the following additions:
There exists an efficient algorithm Invert such that, for any valid (pk i , sk i ), and for all y ∈ Rng(pk i ), Invert(sk i , y) = f Here, we define the multiplicative function f i which can be improving on the security performance. We give the descriptions and the security of all the schemes where f i is the multiplicative function. However it is not necessary for f i to be multiplicative in the description and the security proof of the schemes. 
Adversary Model
In this paper, we consider the security consideration against the following adversary F (for forger) model under the assumption of the random oracle model [1] . This adversary model was first systematically constructed by [9] . Refer to [9] for the detail of this attack model. share the secret keys of the corrupted signers.
• F can adaptively register fictitious signers P
Hence it is the only F to know the secret keys of the fictitious signers.
Multi-signing phase attack
• F can adaptively corrupt any proper signer P i j .
• F can adaptively request any targeted signer P i j that she should generate the multi-signature σ i j on some message m and the corresponding partial multisignature σ i j−1 selected by F . However F cannot ask the signature of the fictitious signers † † † . † We call such a scheme a trivial scheme. † † It is possible for each P i j to check the validity of σ i j−1 before generating her signature σ i j .
† † † Since the fictitious signers exist in the internal F , F cannot use its as the external oracle.
The goal of F is to forge a multi-signature by L -signers including at least one targeted signer P i t . It is important that at least one targeted signer P i t participate the multi-signing generation.
Exact Security
Here we use the definitions given by [1] , [2] which take the presence of ideal hash functions into account, and give an exact security analysis [2] for multi-signature schemes based on one-way trapdoor permutation.
Quantifying the Security of a One-Way Trapdoor
Permutation f Definition 2.5: A probabilistic Turing machine (adversary) I is said to break inverting a one-way trapdoor permutation f i with (τ * , * ), if and only if I can compute an x such that η = f i (x) and η ∈ R Z N i with a success probability greater than * (K i ) within processing time τ * (K i ) for all any security parameter K i ∈ N. The probability is taken over the coin flips of I.
Definition 2.6:
A one-way trapdoor permutation f i is said to be (τ * , * )-secure, if there is no inverter I which (τ * , * )-breaks f i .
Quantifying the Security of Multi-Signature Schemes
Here we define the forgery by F as follows.
Definition 2.7 (ACMA&AIA by F ): A probabilistic Turing machine (for forger) F is said to (τ i , q s , q hash i , i )-break the multi-signature scheme (Gen, MSig, Ver), if after at most q hash i (K i ) queries to the hash oracles hash i , and q s (K i ) signature queries and τ i (K i ) processing time, it outputs a forgery in time at most τ i (K i ) with a success probability at least
Hence we define the security of multi-signature schemes as follows.
Definition 2.8:
A multi-signature scheme (Gen, MSig, Ver) is said to be (τ i , q s , q hash i , i )-secure, if there is no forger F which (τ i , q s , q hash i , i )-breaks the scheme.
Two Existing Schemes
In this section, we show two existing schemes. First, we introduce the f -FDH structure based scheme proposed by Lysyanskaya et al. [8] . Hereafter, we call the scheme f -FDH MS. Next, we introduce the f -PSS structure based scheme proposed by Komano et al. [7] . Hereafter, we call the scheme f -PSS MS.
The f -FDH MS [8]
Key-generation: Each signer
Also each P i has an appropriate (and public) hash function h i : {0, 1} * → Z N i . Multi-signing: Suppose that a set of signers P generates a multi-signature for a message
, the following is executed.
) and the Xor value ρ i j = σ i j−1 ⊕ y i j , where ⊕ denotes the bitwise Xor operation. Finally P i j computes the multi-signature
For each j = L to j = 2, the following is executed by the verifier.
• V computes ρ i j = f i j (σ i j ) and
, and calculates
Finally V obtains σ i 1 , and checks the following equa-
If it holds, then the multi-signature is regarded as a valid one, and as an invalid one, otherwise.
Consequently we can see that the f -FDH MS has resistance against ACMA&AIA by F . Following theorem summarizes the exact security the f -FDH MS in random oracle model.
Theorem 3.1 (Security for the f -FDH MS): Let t satisfy 1 t L . Suppose the t-th inverting
e and T f it (K i t ) denote the basis of the natural logarithm and the time complexity for evaluating f i t respectively.
Proof. (Sketch) Here, we give the security proof following [5] . The strategy of the proof is almost the same as that for Theorem 3.2 in [5] .
The f -PSS MS [7]
Here, we define two hash functions. In the f -PSS MS, signers use two hash functions G and H . The first one, H , called the compressor, maps as H : {0, 1} * → {0, 1} k 1 and the other one, G, called the generator, maps as G :
Key-generation: Each signer P i has the key generation algorithm Gen, on input 1
Multi-signing: Suppose that P generates a multi-signature for a message m.
, where
• P i j receives (m,
may check whether the partial multi-signature
as a signature on m to P i j+1 , where P i L +1 is the verifier.
Verification: Suppose that the verifier
as a multi-signature for a message m. For each j = L to j = 2, the following is executed by the verifier.
•
(That is, let s i j be the first k 0 + k 2 bits of z i j and ω i j be the remaining k 1 bits.) And V calculates (γ i j
Consequently we can see that the f -PSS MS has resistance against ACMA&AIA by F . Following theorem summarizes the exact security the f -PSS MS in random oracle model. The f -PSS MS has much better reduction rate than that the f -FDH MS has.
Theorem 3.2 (Security for the f -PSS MS): Let t satisfy 1 t L . Suppose the t-th inverting
T f it (K i t ) denotes the time complexity for evaluating f i t .
Proof. (Sketch) The proof is the same as that for Theorem 2 in [7] .
Proposed Schemes (The f -PFDH MS)
In this section, we present the proposed scheme.
The f -PFDH MS
We give the f -PFDH MS as follows. Refer to Fig. 1 for a picture.
Key-generation: Each signer
has the key generation algorithm Gen, on input 1 •
, r i j ) and the Xor value ρ i j = σ i j−1 ⊕ y i j . Finally P i j computes the multi-signature Fig. 1 The f -PFDH MS. † If P i j checks the validity and if σ i j−1 appears invalid, P i j must not go on the signature generation, and halts.
Verification: Suppose that the verifier
, r i j ), and calculates
= h i 1 (ID i 1 , m i 1 , r i 1 ). If it holds, then the multi-signature is regarded as a valid one, and as an invalid one, otherwise.
Security Consideration
Strategy of the Security Proof
The security proof of the f -PFDH MS against F is based on the following strategy:
1. If there exists a forger F which can forge the multisignature scheme, then we can construct an inverter I, which can invert f i j , using it. 2. I guesses the targeted signer P i t by F , where t ∈ {1, . . . , L } † , and embeds the problem to solve for itself in P i t 's public-key f i t . If I fails, then the simulation will abort. The abortion is also occurred, when P i t has been corrupted by F , P i t has changed to P ( f ) i j or F has not been able to forge the multi-signature including the signature of P i t . Because I fails to guess the targeted signer. 3. I defines all signers' pairs of matching secret-key and public-key except P i t 's and P ( f ) i j 's by using key generation algorithm Gen by itself, and hands over the pairs of keys which F uses for P (c) i j .
I prepares the signing oracle
Σ sk i 1 , . . . , Σ sk i L , except for Σ i t † † , but cannot simulate P ( f ) i j .
A hash oracle h i t is simulated by I, therefore I must
reply to the arbitrary query from F .
The Security Results
In the f -PFDH MS, the arguments of the hash function h i j is not only (ID
. Thereby we can give the security proof against ACMA&AIA by F † † † . In Game 2 of the security proof, I can reply the hash value, since I can recognize the history of the signing order I D [i 1 ,i j ] . From this reason, I can register the σ i j−1 corresponding m, r with the h i j -List. Consequently I can simulate the individually Σ sk i j † † † † . The following theorem summarizes the exact security of the f -PFDH MS. We give the security proof obeying the statements mentioned above.
Theorem 5.1: (Security for the f -PFDH MS): Let t satisfy 1 t L . Suppose the t-th inverting f i t is (τ
e and T f it (K i t ) denote the basis natural logarithm and the time complexity for evaluating f i t respectively.
Proof. In order to prove Theorem 5.1, we use the following lemma in [13] .
Lemma 5.1: Let E, E , F be events defined on a probability space such that
Then we have
Our overall strategy for the proof is as follows: We apply the Game introduced by [13] to evaluate the security. We define a sequence Game 0 , Game 1 ,. . . , Game 4 of modified attack games starting from the actual game. Each of the games operates on the same underlying probability space. In particular, the public-key and secret-key of the cryptosystem, the coin tosses of F , the values of the random oracle h i j takes on identical values across all games. We start from the actual situation Game 0 , in which F can access the real signing oracle Σ sk i j , and construct I using the output of F , with gradually altering the situation around F , and with simulating Σ sk i j . In the simulation of random oracle h i j we construct the input-output lists h i j -List. The h i j -List holds (b, I D, m, r, u, y, σ i j−1 ), the bit b = 0/1 † † † † † , the query I D, m, r, and the hash value y as the answer.
Game 0 : Let Game 0 be the original attack game. I simulates the key generation and multi-signing phases as follows. † F must select at least one targeted signer P it among Lsigners, and must forge her signature † † Here, Σ sk i j denotes that I simulates the signing oracle Σ i j by using sk i j . Therefore I cannot prepare Σ sk it , so I doesn't know sk it . But I will somehow simulate Σ it by using pk it . † † † The detail can be seen in Sect. 3.2.2 in [5] . † † † † If F makes the hash query (ID i j , m [i 1 ,i j ] , σ i j−1 ) to I, then I can answer the hash value, since I can also recognize the signing order. Consequently I can simulate the individual Σ sk i j . However such a scheme cannot be verified, because the verifier tries to compute y i j in order to obtain σ i j−1 ; nevertheless the arguments of y i j are necessary σ i j−1 It is impossible so far the hash function is the random oracle function.
† † † † † b = 0 denotes that η is not embedded for the query, and b = 1 denotes that η is embedded for the query. Here, f it is the publickey and η is chosen at random in Z N it . I tries to find an x such that η = f it (x). Beforehand I must guess the targeted signer P i t whom F selects among P . I starts running F the same as Game 0 . However if the following three situations should be occurred, then the simulation, controlled by I, will abort.
Key generation phase attack
• In key generation phase, F has corrupted P i t , or
• In Multi-signing phase, F has also corrupted P i t .
• The forged multi-signature σ * i L does not contain the signature of P i t .
Therefore the success probability is changed into
. Hence at least one targeted signer must exist among L -signers while F has produced the forged multi-signature successfully. r i t , we distinguish two cases.
If r i t ∈ R , I selects a random number u
. Here, I may generate σ i t−1 by using f
to obey the regular protocol y
into the h i t -List.
If r i t R , I selects a random number
Here, I may generate σ i t−1 by using f
to obey the regular protocol
In the proposed scheme, the arguments of the hash function h i t is not only ( , which has been selected by F in Game 2 , and has been registered by I onto h i t -List † † † , then I selects a salt r i t ∈ R and discards it from the list R . Since the list R includes initially q s random salts and there are at most q s signature queries, this is always successful. If there was already a hash query
and I returns the partial multi-signature u
. Conse- † Here, the buried η means using η in the hash generation by I. Namely, the hash value y it consists of η.
† † It is impossible for F to distinguish "b = 0" from "b = 1". Because F cannot find the difference in b. Here, "b = 0" means I does not bury η in the hash value y it . On the other hand, "b = 1" means I buries η in the hash value y it .
† † † Each value in h it -List is the following: Game 4 : From the outside, the I receives ( f i t , η) where η is chosen at random in Z N it such that η = f i t (x), and sets f i t = pk i t . I starts running F on inputs pk [1,L ] including this pk i t . F will make oracle queries (each signing query and h i t -query). Then I answers the signing query and the hash query by using the pk i t and the η. But F cannot distinguish the pk i t which is generated from Gen(1 K it ) by I from the one which are given from the outside. Because the indistinguishability is generated by an assumption on one-way function and key generation algorithm. Thus we have Pr [S 4 
) · · · . Consequently, by using the property of f i t which is a multiplicative function, I can compute the f
, since f i t is multiplicative
If the size k 0 of the salt is greater than log 2 q s , we obtain if q s 2:
Theorem 5.1 is now proven. Total size of signatures The computational amount for verification
Efficiency Consideration
In this section, we let f i j be the RSA function, which is a multiplicative permutation.
Computational Cost
We evaluate the computational amount for verification in the proposed scheme with the required number of multiplications under the modulo of the size K as its measure, and also the total size of a signature. We suppose that every N i is of the size K. Assuming the condition that L -signers participating, we compare the verification costs and the total sizes of signatures for the scheme in which each signer applies the single-signature scheme based on f -PSS † , those for the f -FDH MS, those for the f -PSS MS, and those for the proposed scheme. In the first scheme, a multi-signature by P is the sequence of L signatures by the L signers.
We can evaluate that when the security parameter for P i j is K i j , the computational cost for one exponentiation using the public-key e i j = 2 16 + 1 under the modulo N i j is 17
where costM(K) denotes the computational cost for one multiplication under the modulo of the size K. [2] , we obtain that k 0 , k 1 must satisfy k 0 > 151 and k 1 > 183, respectively. Therefore we obtain the sizes k 0 = 152 and k 1 = 184. The signature sizes in the f -FDH MS, the f -PSS MS and the proposed scheme are increased by only 1(=: d F ), 152(=: d P ) and 30(=: d), and are in proportion to the number of the signers.
The Reduction Rate and the Recommended Key Size
Next, we compare the f -FDH MS [8] , the f -PSS MS [7] and the f -PFDH MS as the proposed scheme. Since the random salt as the argument of the hash function can be used in the f -PSS MS and the f -PFDH MS, these schemes have a good reduction rate. In both schemes, the order of the security results is /L . On the other hand, in the f -FDH MS, the random salt cannot be used, this scheme has no good reduction rate. Therefore the order of the security results is /(e · L · q s ). In this paper, as we are trying to discuss under "the same security level," we evaluate the recommended key size obeying the evaluation in [11] . In [11] , authors argued that the recommended key size is necessary to deny the existence of the forger F which can compute the integer factoring (IF) of 1024 size. We suppose the hardness of an inverting RSA is identical with that of an IF. Then we have that it takes time E(N) := exp (64/9) 1/3 log N 1/3 log log N 2/3 to invert RSA using the number field sieve method, where N ∼ 2 1024 , and k 0 and k 1 , in the f -PSS MS and the proposed scheme, are large sufficiently so that we can neglect the effect yielded by the terms which deteriorate the reduction rate. Consequently we can evaluate the reduction rate of f -FDH MS, f -PSS MS and the proposed scheme as
† , where (2 1024 ) which is the required time for factoring a 1024-bit integer, and E(2 K ) into T * . Then we can have an equation with the unknown K, and obtain the recommended K in the f -FDH MS. Similarly, we can also obtain the recommended K in the f -PSS MS and the proposed scheme. In Table 2 , we show that the recommended key sizes for P i 1 are necessary for f -FDH MS, f -PSS MS and the proposed scheme to keep the security level which is as the same as the difficulty of the 1024-IF.
From Table 2 , we can give the concrete recommended key size to evaluate the total size of signatures in Table 1 . So, we can argue under "the same security level" at last. Consequently, in Table 3 , we show the comparison of the total size of signatures under the recommended key size. The total size of signatures in Table 3 has the unit of "bit."
As a result, if the number of the participating signers should not exceed 42, then the total size of signatures in the proposed scheme is smaller than that in the f -FDH MS. Table 2 The recommended key size for P i 1 (Security level: 1024-IF). Table 3 The total size of signatures under the recommended key size. However, if the number of participating signers becomes 42 or more, the signature size in the proposed scheme will exceed that in f -FDH MS. Because the advantage that the short key size is obtained from the tighter reduction rate in the proposed scheme, has been offset as the number of participating signers is increasing. Consequently, we find that though the f -FDH MS is bad reduction rate, the signature size of the proposed scheme exceeded that of f -FDH MS. According to [8] , the authors argue that these multisignature scheme are useful for a hierarchy of certification authorities (CAs). However we think that the depth of CA seldom become more 42. The depth is at most 3 or 4. Thus we regard the proposed scheme as a practical one.
On the other hand, in [6] , Komano et al. give the tightest security proof of the f -PSS MS, following the approach of Coron [3] . In the proof, we can see that k 0 can be as small as log 2 q s , where q s is the number of signature queries made by F . Thereby they can evaluate k 0 to be about 30. In the signature size, their results equalize with ours. However the structure of the f -PSS MS is more complex than that of the proposed scheme. Table 4 summarizes the times of operation processing. It is obvious that the proposed scheme has a simpler structure.
Conclusion
In this paper, we have proposed the probabilistic FDH-based multi-signature scheme. The proposed scheme can obtain the tightest security proof by using the random component. Comparing with the f -PSS MS, the proposed scheme is consisted to have a simple structure. Especially, only one hashing is necessary in the signature generation for one signer. Moreover, the security performance is guaranteed by shorter random component. Comparing with the f -FDH MS, if the number of the participating signers should not exceed † The reduction rate for the scheme [7] is worse in the original paper. But from [6] , we can evaluate it to be the same with ours.
42, then total size of signatures of the proposed scheme is smaller than that of the f -FDH MS. Thus the proposed scheme is quite efficient. In our scheme, the size of random component can be reduced to be optimal.
